CDF Propaganda: An Examination of HH’s Ideological Program

President Hakainde Hichilema has repeatedly touted the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) as one of his main political successes. At the current rate, each constituency is set to receive almost K150 million. On paper, this is a significant amount of money poised to transform Zambia permanently. With three cycles already completed, one wonders how the respective constituencies managed to spend over K80 million—only the president knows.

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of presidential ideological programs in Zambia has long been a subject of debate, primarily due to their alignment with the interests of the sitting president. Often, these programs are designed more to bolster the president’s public image than to effect substantive development. Instead of yielding tangible results, they typically lead to a cycle of disappointment and resource misallocation, with successive administrations perpetuating a pattern of inefficiency emblematic of post-independence governance.

Since independence, various presidential initiatives—from cooperatives to agricultural advancements, and more recently, the Constituency Development Fund—have consistently demonstrated poor returns on investment. Millions of Kwachas have been spent with very little to show for it. Despite official proclamations of success, these programs have been characterized by a wastage of state resources. At best, they lack accountability, while government-controlled media project an image of progress. Unfortunately, comprehensive accounting of the financial losses incurred due to these initiatives remains obscured. One still cannot find a report on the misuse of these funds—conspicuously keeping hidden the corruption that underpins these programs. This recurring theme can aptly be described as “the Zambian way.”

Today, President Hakainde Hichilema’s management of the CDF exhibits similar shortcomings. State media outlets convey assurances of its effectiveness; however, the outcomes suggest otherwise. High-profile expenditures—such as the procurement of police vehicles and ambulances using CDF allocations—raise critical questions regarding the logic underpinning this funding strategy. With established ministries, such as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Home Affairs, designated to oversee such assets, one wonders why these ministries do not utilize their respective budget lines for vehicle acquisitions. Instead, it appears that these purchases serve as instruments of political propaganda aimed at projecting the flawed success of a fundamentally misguided ideological program.

Furthermore, a notable characteristic of these programs is the substantial funding allocated without robust mechanisms for accountability. The overarching political motivations driving these initiatives often exempt them from the scrutiny typically demanded of public expenditure. Questions surrounding project viability and oversight remain inadequately addressed: Who assesses the effectiveness of the funded projects? What accountability frameworks exist for beneficiaries who apply for or misuse allocated funds? Who qualifies to evaluate the viability of a cooperative or loan applicant? And what are the consequences of failing to repay loans? While local government has been designated as the appropriate administrative body for these funds, doubts persist regarding its capacity to manage the array of projects inherent to the CDF. The ministry’s original mandate did not include administering the CDF; in short, it is not qualified to manage it. The president should have established a different body to administer this fund!

As Zambia approaches the 2026 elections, one can anticipate an intensification of propaganda surrounding the CDF. However, despite the claims dominating the Zambia News and Information Services (ZANIS) and the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), a dissonance exists between official narratives and the lived experiences of the populace. The critical question persists: How much public money has been expended on these initiatives, and how does that figure compare to the positive outcomes depicted in governmental communications?

In summary, the CDF—much like its predecessors—risks relegating itself to the annals of political rhetoric, devoid of genuine accountability and effective governance. The challenge remains to break free from the cycle of propaganda and demand a more transparent and responsible approach to public resource management in Zambia. The CDF is, at best, wasted money, and at worst, stolen money!

By Kapya Kaoma