By Isaac C Mvula
Having worked closely with 11 Army Commanders, from General Benjamin N Mibenge to General Paul Mihova, spanning 32 years, I have observed that each one of them had their own style of command, management and leadership. I came to the conclusion that the most effective and successful were those who listened to the counsel of their subordinates, whether sensible or not. I worked with some Commanders that could not be advised. They displayed an ‘I know it all’ attitude. They only served to advise their advisors. Incorrigible.
General Geojago Musengule was the type of Army Commander that listened to you attentively, no matter how small you were. Even if what you were saying was not making sense to yourself, he would not shut you up. He would let you finish talking.
As a former impregnable defender in the Zambia Army Football Club, the forerunner of the former indomitable Green Buffaloes Football Club (GBFC), he knew well that in every competition, one has to carefully assess one’s strengths and weaknesses against those of the opponent, or enemy.
Civilians call it ‘SWOT Analysis.’ This is a strategic planning technique used to help a person or organization identify Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats related to business compensation or project planning. The military call it an Appreciation. It is a worthy tool for young men seeking competitive advantage over others, in a competition over a beautiful young lady.
“You two will get me fired. But be sure that I am not going down alone. I will take you down with me,” General Musengule said to Lieutenant Colonel D M Kauseni (Brigadier General) and me, after going through a paper we had prepared. The previous day, just before cease work, around 1700 hrs, the Army Commander had summoned the two of us to his office and ordered us to burn the midnight oil and present that paper to him first thing the following morning. It was an assignment from State House. We spent the whole night working on that paper.
“Do your very best to produce a good paper that will satisfy the President,” the Commander had emphasized. Lieutenant Colonel Kauseni was GSO 1 in charge of Operations and Training, while I was GSO 2 Intelligence.
The assignment had to do with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Although many people had not heard much about him before he ascended to power after overthrowing Mobutu Sese Seko on 17th May 1997, Lauren-Desire Kabila was a revolutionary of no small magnitude. This was a man who had rubbed shoulders and fought together with world renowned revolutionaries, including the famous Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, an Argentine Marxist revolutionary guerrilla leader and military theorist, among many things. About Kabila, Che Guevara had said, of all the people he met during his campaign in Congo, only Kabila had genuine qualities of a mass leader. So highly esteemed.
Kabila was the leader of Tutsi forces from the province of South Kivu, called the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), which was supported by Rwanda and Uganda. He became the third president of DRC after Mobutu ran away to Morocco, where he died in exile.
By 1998, Kabila’s former allies in Rwanda and Uganda had turned against him and backed a new rebellion of the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), after feeling that their control of the Great Lakes region was under threat. The RCD forces were advancing speedily when Kabila pleaded for help from SADC.
Zambia has always been a very influential and prominent member of SADC. President F T J Chiluba of Zambia was a close personal friend of Kabila. Speculations were that it was because Chiluba had Congolese parentage, and that he had launched Kabila’s command element through Kasumbalesa, that was why Kabila pronounced his victory in ousting Mobutu, from Lubumbashi, although his major thrust was from the North.
Things were now getting hot for Kabila. Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe responded positively to Kabila’s call for help, and sent troops into DRC.
President Chiluba’s order to the Army Commander, was to work out how Zambia was going to help his friend Kabila. That was the order that the Commander passed to Lieutenant Colonel Kauseni and myself. Come up with an Operations Plan.
As we sat brainstorming in Colonel Kauseni’s office that evening, he asked me to provide the strengths of forces involved in the conflict. After a long time of consideration, we concluded to recommend that Zambia should not be involved in the conflict. Totally different from what we had been directed to do. We ‘knocked out’ a detailed paper justifying our position.
The following morning we went to meet the Army Commander.
“No. We can’t tell the President that we can’t go. He directed me to advise him how we will help, not whether we can or cannot,” General Musengule insisted. Colonel Kauseni requested to consider the reasons we had advanced. After reading through again, he looked up to the ceiling, with his head held in his hands.
“It makes sense, but it is not right. I cannot go and tell the Commander-in-Chief that I cannot obey his order,” he said, more to himself, than to us.
We had argued that the countries that had sent troops to DRC had good reasons for doing so. We didn’t. Angola was in it just to protect its already embattled oilfields in the Cabinda enclave up in the North. Also, it was aware that Savimbi’s UNITA forces were using the northern border to transit diamonds into DRC in exchange for arms and ammunition. Similarly, Namibia and Zimbabwe appeared to be interesting in harvesting diamonds and other precious stones and minerals from DRC. As for Zimbabwe, it was also to divert the attention of its people from the ongoing political problems it was going through back home. These were in the public domain. Africa Confidential reported extensively on that. Namibia and Zimbabwe did not share borders with DRC, so the effects of the conflict could not spill over into their territories.
As for Zambia, we noted that DRC shared borders with us in four provinces, namely, North-Western, Copperbelt, Luapula, and Northern. The spill-over effects would be catastrophic, if the conflict escalated. We would not be able to handle the situation since our troops were already stretched by other assignments. Additionally, the government was unable to adequately support local operations. How was it going to support our troops in a foreign land, with an extended logistic tail? Further, war is expensive. It would take away resources from the social sector such as health and education, to apply to the Defence Budget. It could cause much suffering among the people, thus making the government unpopular. Lastly, the arrival of body bags would cause problems among the populace.
The Commander decided to take it before his Generals, who also agreed with us. Next, he summoned other service chiefs, who also agreed with our reasoning.
“Prepare a PowerPoint presentation and the two of you should be ready to make the President at State House. I will ask for an appointment. Let me know as soon as you are ready,” the Commander directed.
We got the presentation ready and rehearsed. We accompanied the Army Commander and the other Service Chiefs to State House at around 1600 hrs. I set up my equipment in a smaller hall, ready for the presentation.
President Chiluba appeared only at 2000 hrs. His Private Secretary kept assuring us that he was around, and would be seeing us soon. When he arrived, he went straight and took his seat. We all stood up and saluted. He did not respond. He just motioned that we go ahead with the presentation. I noticed that his eyes were small, and sunken. The Army Commander introduced all of us. Lieutenant Colonel Kauseni (Brigadier General) had a field day, making the presentation. I had never seen him that confident.
When the presentation was over, the Commander asked if the Commander-in-Chief had any question. President Chiluba just stood up, and walked out, visibly annoyed.
We all remained standing, lost for what to do next, until the Private Secretary came back, about 10 minutes later, to tell us to go. The atmosphere was tense. You could hear a pin drop on that red wall-to-wall fluffy carpet.
As we walked out to our waiting cars, General Musengule joked, “Gentlemen, whoever gets the letter of dismissal, please alert the others.”
I later asked the Commander what the President had said concerning that presentation. He said nothing. Not a word.
Lauren-Desire Kabila survived that rebel onslaught, but was shot dead in his office on 16th January 2001, allegedly by one of his security. His son, Joseph Kabila, succeeded him 8 days later.
